Bayesian Propositional Logic by Jarmużek, Tomasz et al.
Bulletin of the Section of Logic
Volume 46:3/4 (2017), pp. 151–168
http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/0138-0680.46.3.4.01
Tomasz Jarmuz˙ek∗, Mateusz Klonowski† and Jacek Malinowski
BAYESIAN PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC
Abstract
We define and investigate from a logical point of view a family of consequence
relations defined in probabilistic terms. We call them relations of supporting, and
write: |≈w, where w is a probability function on a Boolean language. A |≈w B
iff the fact that A is the case does not decrease a probability of being B the
case. Finally, we examine the intersection of |≈w, for all w, and give some formal
properties of it.
Keywords: logical entailment, statistical inference, Bayesian inference, cor-
roboration, confirmation.
1. Introduction
Let us consider a popular example concerning conditional probability. Sup-
pose there are two bowls full of cookies. Bowl 1 contains 10 chocolate chips
and 30 plain cookies, while bowl 2 contains 20 of each. We pick a bowl at
random, and then pick a cookie at random. The cookie turns out to be a
plain one. How probable is it that we picked it out of bowl 1? Intuitively,
it seems clear that the answer should be more than a half, since there
are more plain cookies in bowl 1. The precise answer is given by Bayes’
formula:
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p(H | O) =
p(O | H) · p(H)
p(O)
where:
• p(O | H) is the conditional probability of seeing the observation O
given that the hypothesis H is true
• p(H) is the prior probability of H
• p(O) is the prior probability of O.
Now let H1 corresponds to bowl 1, and H2 to bowl 2. It is given that
the bowls are identical, thus p(H1) = p(H2), and the two must add up to 1,
so both are equal to 0,5. The datum O is the observation of a plain cookie.
From the content of the bowls, we know that p(O | H1) = 30/40 = 0, 75 and
p(O | H2) = 20/40 = 0, 5. Moreover we know that p(O) = 50/80 = 0, 625,
because there are 50 plain cookies among 80 cookies in general. More
precise p(O) = p(O | H1) · p(H1) + p(O | H2) · p(H2) = (3/4) · (1/2) +
(1/2) · (1/2) = 0, 625. Bayes’ formula then yields p(H1 | O) = 0, 6. Before
observing the cookie, the probability bowl 1 has been chosen, was 0,5. After
observing the cookie is a plain one, we revise the probability to p(H1 | O),
which is 0,6.
The hypothesisH1 has been here tested by the evidence O. The relation
between O and H1 seems to be similar to the relation between a premiss
and a conclusion.
The above procedure of testing hypotheses by evidence has been exten-
sively studied by philosophers of science as one of possible answers to the
question of how we can evaluate a degree to which available experiments
and observations support a general scientific hypothesis. For more details
we refer to Carnap’s confirmation theory elaborated in [1] and to corrobo-
ration theory proposed in the central book in this area [10]. For the review
of more recent developments we refer the reader to [2], [5] and [6].
The aim of this paper is to investigate from a purely logical point of
view the relation described above. We define a propositional language
which allows us to consider events like O and H as sentences. Then we
construct some semantics by considering probabilities as valuations. This
enables us to determine relation of support |≈.
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2. Basic concepts
Let Ln denotes a n-generated sentential language with connectives ∧, ∨,
¬, →, ↔ generated by n-element set V = {q1, ...qn} of sentential variables.
We will identify language Ln with its set of sentences (well formed formu-
las). By small characters p, q, r (with or without indices) we will denote
the sentential variables while capitals A, B, C, P , Q, R denote arbitrary
sentences of Ln.
By classical logic in the language Ln we mean the binary relation |=
n
between sets of sentences and single sentences defined in the following stan-
dard way: X |=n A iff for every classical valuation v : Ln 7−→ {0, 1},
v(A) = 1, whenever v(X) ⊆ {1}. Symbol |=n A means that A is a classical
tautology. If it does not lead to misunderstanding we will skip superscript
n in |=n.
Relation |= forms here a base for another inference-like relations defined
by means of probability functions. The general framework in which we work
is that of [7].
Instead of a pure probability we use here a notion of probabilistic valu-
ation. Our definition is based on well known Kolmogorov’s axiomatization
of a finitely additive probability function (probability measure) presented
in [3].
By a probabilistic valuation on the language Ln we mean a function
defined on Ln with values in the unit interval of reals [0, 1]. Such function
w, for each sentences A,B satisfies the following conditions:
(W1) 0 6 w(A) 6 1
(W2) w(A) = 1, for some sentence A
(W3) w(A) 6 w(B), whenever A |= B
(W4) w(A ∨B) = w(A) + w(B), whenever A |= ¬B.
The definition was – among others – introduced in [7, p. 113].
The conditions (W1)–(W4) correspond to Kolomogorov’s axioms defin-
ing a finitely additive probability function. For many aims it is necessary to
strength (W4) to allow infinite joins. For example, it would be needed, if we
considered infinitely generated sentential language – i.e. a language with
infinitely many sentential variables. However, in this paper we consider
only finitely generated sentential languages and we do not need infinite
joins of sentences.
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All classical valuations satisfy the conditions (W1)–(W4) and so they
can be recognised as a limit case of probabilistic valuations. Of course not
every probabilistic valuation is a classical one.
We omit the adjective ‘probabilistic’ in the rest of this paper. Hence-
forth a ‘valuation’ means always ‘probabilistic valuation’. Furthermore, we
assume an abbreviation, by writing A |= |=B, we shortly declare that A |= B
and B |= A. Sometimes, we also will write CPL, having in mind classical
propositional logic.
Next proposition describes some well known properties of probabilistic
valuation:
Proposition 1. For any valuation w the following condition holds :
(W5) w(A) = 1, if |= A
(W6) w(¬A) = 1− w(A)
(W7) w(A1 ∨ ... ∨An) = w(A1) + ...+ w(An), whenever Ai |= ¬Aj , for all
i 6= j such that 1 6 i, j 6 n
(W8) w(A) = w(B), if A |= |=B
(W9) w(A ∨B) = w(A) + w(B)− w(A ∧B).
Most of those conditions for probabilistic valuations were considered
by Makinson in [7]. For example, a proof of (W5) is given on page 191,
while some proofs of (W6) and (W8) on page 192.
It is well known that any function f : {q1, ..., qn} 7−→ {0, 1} can be
uniquely extended to the classical valuation of Ln. However in case of prob-
abilistic valuations it is more complicated. A function f : {q1, ..., qn} 7−→
[0, 1] might have many possible extensions to a probabilistic valuation.
By a literal of Ln we mean either a sentential variable or a negation
of sentential variable. By a state description in the language Ln we mean
any conjunction of n literals in fixed order. Each i-th conjunct of a such
conjunction is either qi or ¬qi. Of course in any language Ln there is
exactly 2n state descriptions. A function f from the set SD of all of 2n
state descriptions into the unit interval [0, 1] such that
∑
s∈SD f(s) = 1 will
be called a probability distribution.
The following proposition holds by classical propositional logic.
Proposition 2. Every sentence which is not a contradiction is classically
equivalent to a disjunction of unique non-empty subset of state descriptions.
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In the further parts of our paper when we take for a sentence A some
logically equivalent disjunction of state descriptions s1∨· · ·∨sn, we always
assume that {s1, . . . , sn} is a unique non-empty subset of state descriptions
mentioned in proposition 2.
Theorem 3. Each probability distribution can be in a unique way extended
to a valuation satisfying (W1)–(W4).
Proof. Let sentence A of language Ln be not a contradiction. By proposi-
tion 2 we take a disjunction of state descriptions s1, ..., sk classically equiv-
alent to A. Then we put w(A) = f(s1)+ ...+f(sk). If A is a contradiction,
then we put w(A) = 0. It is easy to check that w satisfies conditions
(W1)–(W4). The idea of probability distribution and outline of the proofs
that concerns can be also found in [7, p. 115–116]. 
Theorem 3 shows that there is one-to-one correspondence between val-
uations and probability distributions, since state of descriptions are always
uniquely valuated, valuations satisfy conditions (W1)–(W4), and then we
can reduce any valuation w to an probability distribution f .
For this reason probability distributions give us a formal tool for the
study of probabilistic inference relation defined below.
Let w denote a probabilistic valuation. Then for any sentences A and
B such that w(A) 6= 0 a function wA(B) defined as
wA(B) =
w(A ∧B)
w(A)
will be called a conditional probability.
Writing a probability function, we will always assume that a given
denominator of the fraction is different from zero. Next well known theorem
express an important property of conditional probability:
Bayes’ Theorem. For any sentences A,B:
wA(B) =
wB(A) · w(B)
w(A)
Makinson in [7] mentioned certain families of probabilistic consequence
relations. Among them he distinguished some relations that are very similar
to what we will examine here. He called the relations incremental proba-
bilistic consequences, but did not study their properties (except the failure
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of monotonicity) [7, p. 130]. Some examination of those interpretations we
leave as a subject of a future work.
Now we come to the main notion of this paper – probabilistic entailment.
Let A,B ∈ Ln. We say that A supports B under a valuation w, in symbols
A |≈nw B if and only if either w(A) = 0 or w(A) 6= 0 and wA(B) > w(B).
The fact that A |≈nw B for a valuation w in Ln will be denoted by A |≈w B,
if the context clearly indicates the language Ln. The fact that A |≈
n
w B
for all valuation w will be denoted by A |≈n B. Obviously |≈n⊆|≈nw. If the
context clearly indicates the language Ln, then we simply write A |≈
n B.
Probability theorists often examined and used relations |≈w, but so far they
have not made any comprehensive study of their logical properties.
The relation of supporting is a kind of statistical or probabilistic en-
tailment. However it is better to speak about supporting relation rather
than about some kind of logical entailment, since such relation does not
satisfy the main feature of logical entailment, i.e. it does not guarantee
that conclusions are true, whenever premisses are true. Instead it has got
a weaker feature: the level of certainty of conclusion does not decrease, if
premisses are true.
On the other hand the relation of supporting generalizes logical entail-
ment and seems to satisfy natural intuitions. Thus suppose that A and B
describe some events and if the event described by A is the case, then the
event described by B is not less probable and maybe even more probable
than without A. By increasing probability, in fact, we understand that
B can be more probable with A than without A. That is way we call |≈
supporting relation.
Bayes’ theorem allows us to characterize the relation of |≈ in terms
of a valuation w. Theorem 4 below summarizes these results. What is
here especially unexpected, is that conditions (i) and (iv) are equivalent,
which shows that the relation of supporting is symmetric. Although such
equivalence is just an obvious consequence of the definition of |≈ it seems
to be an important feature which distinguishes statistical reasoning from
other kinds of reasoning.
Theorem 4. The following conditions are equivalent :
(i) A supports B under w
(ii) w(A ∧B) · w(¬B) > w(A ∧ ¬B) · w(B)
(iii) w(A ∧B) > w(A) · w(B)
(iv) B supports A under w.
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Proof. We will prove equivalence of (ii) and (iii).
1. w(A ∧B) > w(A) · w(B) iff by (W8)
2. w(A ∧B) > w((A ∧ ¬B) ∨ (A ∧B)) · w(B) iff by (W4)
3. w(A ∧B) > (w(A ∧ ¬B) + w(A ∧B)) · w(B) iff
4. w(A ∧B)− w(A ∧B) · w(B) > w(A ∧ ¬B) · w(B) iff
5. w(A ∧B) · (1− w(B)) > w(A ∧ ¬B) · w(B) iff by (W6)
6. w(A ∧B) · w(¬B) > w(A ∧ ¬B) · w(B).
The remaining claims are immediate consequences of Bayes’ theorem
and the definition of |≈. 
3. Characterization of |≈
In this section we consider the relations |≈n for some n-generated sentential
language.
S. Kraus, D. Lehmann and M. Magidor considered in [4] some Gentzen
style rules as an axiomatization of certain classes of non-monotonic supra-
classical logic.
(LLE)
|=A↔B, A|≈C
B|≈C
(RLE)
|=A↔B, C|≈A
C|≈B
(Cl)
A|=B
A|≈B
(Ctp)
A|≈B
¬B|≈¬A
We will add two more rules to the list they proposed and then we check
all of them for relation |≈.
(Sym)
A|≈B
B|≈A
(Sim)
A∧C|≈B A∧¬C|≈B
A|≈B
Theorem 5. The rules (LLE), (RLE), (Cl), (Sim), (Sym), (Ctp) hold
for any valuation.
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Proof. (LLE) Suppose that |= A ↔ B and A |≈ C, then w(B) = w(A)
and hence w(B∧C) = w(A∧C) > w(A) ·w(C) = w(B) ·w(C). So, B |≈ C.
Hence by Theorem 4, B |≈ C.
(RLE) Suppose that |= A↔ B and C |≈ A. Then w(B) = w(A). Moreover,
w(C ∧ B) = w(C ∧ A) > w(C) · w(A) = w(C) · w(B). Hence by Theorem
4, C |≈ B.
(Cl) Suppose that A |= B, then A |= |=A ∧ B. Therefore by (W8), w(A) =
w(A ∧ B). If w(A) = 0, then by definition of |≈, A |≈ B. Let w(A) 6=
0. Hence wA(B) =
w(A∧B)
w(A) = 1, and so w(B) 6 wA(B). Therefore by
Theorem 4, A |≈ B.
(Ctp) Suppose that A |≈ B, then by Theorem 4, w(A∧B) > w(A) ·w(B).
1. w(¬A ∧ ¬B) = 1− w(A ∨B) by CPL, (W6)
2. 1− w(A ∨B) = 1− w(A)− w(B) + w(A ∧B) by (W9)
3. 1− w(A)− w(B) + w(A ∧B) > 1− w(A)− w(B) + w(A) · w(B)
by assumptions
4. 1− w(A)− w(B) + w(A) · w(B) = (1− w(A)) · (1− w(B))
5. (1− w(A)) · (1− w(B)) = w(¬A) · w(¬B) by (W6)
6. w(¬A ∧ ¬B) > w(¬A) · w(¬B) 1, 5.
Hence, by Theorem 4, ¬A |≈ ¬B.
(Sym) The rule (Sym) is an obvious consequence of Theorem 4.
(Sim) Suppose that A∧C |≈ B and A∧¬C |≈ B. Therefore by Theorem 4,
w(A∧C ∧B) > w(A∧C) ·w(B) and w(A∧¬C ∧B) > w(A∧¬C) ·w(B).
1. w(A ∧B) = w((A ∧B ∧ C) ∨ (A ∧B ∧ ¬C)) by CPL and (W8)
2. w((A ∧B ∧ C) ∨ (A ∧B ∧ ¬C)) = w(A ∧B ∧ C) + w(A ∧B ∧ ¬C)
by CPL and (W4)
3. w(A∧B∧C)+w(A∧B∧¬C) > w(A∧C) ·w(B)+w(A∧¬C) ·w(B)
by assumptions
4. w(A∧C) ·w(B)+w(A∧¬C) ·w(B) = w(B) · (w(A∧C)+w(A∧¬C))
5. w(B) · (w(A ∧ C) + w(A ∧ ¬C)) = w(B) · w((A ∧ C) ∨ (A ∧ ¬C))
by CPL and (W4)
6. w(B) · w((A ∧ C) ∨ (A ∧ ¬C)) = w(A) · w(B) by CPL and (W8)
7. w(A ∧B) > w(A) · w(B) 1, 6.
So, by Theorem 4, A |≈ B. 
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According to (Cl) classical consequence relation is included in |≈. The-
orem 5 shows that |≈ is essentially “larger” than |=, since |≈ fulfils (Sym).
Theorem 6. (David Makinson) A |≈ B iff either A |= B or B |= A.1
Proof. ⇐= part is an immediate consequence of (Cl) and (Sym). To
prove =⇒ let us suppose that A 6|= B and B 6|= A. By CPL it means
that there are two distinct state descriptions, sentences s′ and s′′ such that
s′ |= A, s′ |= ¬B, s′′ |= B and s′′ |= ¬A.
Let r denote any real number 0 < r < 1. Let us define the probability
distribution f on the set SD of state descriptions in the following way:
f(s) =


r if s = s′
1− r if s = s′′
0 otherwise.
By Theorem 3 function f can be uniquely extended to valuation w. By
proposition 2 we have such unique set of state descriptions {s1, . . . , sk} that
A∧B |= |=s1∨. . .∨sk. Surely, neither s
′ ∈ {s1, . . . , sk}, nor s
′′ ∈ {s1, . . . , sk}.
So, by definition of extension of f – given in Theorem 3 – w(A ∧B) = 0.
By proposition 2 we have also such unique set of state descriptions
{s1, . . . , sk} that B |= |=s1 ∨ . . . ∨ sk. Surely, s
′ 6∈ {s1, . . . , sk}, but s
′′ ∈
{s1, . . . , sk}. So, by definition of extension of f , w(B) = 1− r > 0.
Combining two above facts, we get w(A∧B) < w(B), and so A 6|≈ B. 
From Theorem 6 we have an obvious corollary.
Corollary 1. A |≈ B iff either |= A→ B or |= B → A.
Similarly as for |= we can define a notion of tautology for |≈ relation
as a sentence which is supported by any sentence. It is a natural question
whether there are non-classical tautologies of |≈. The answer appears to
be unexpected.
Theorem 7. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) A is a classical tautology or a contradiction.
(ii) For any B, B |≈ A.
(iii) For any B, A |≈ B.
1This theorem is by David Makinson. It was communicated in an email letter.
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Proof. Ad. (i) =⇒ (ii). Suppose that A is a classical tautology. Then,
because any function w is an extension of some probability distribution,
w(A) = 1. Since we have A ∧ B |= |=B, then by (W8) w(A ∧ B) = w(B).
Therefore w(B ∧A) = w(B) = w(A) ·w(B). Hence by Theorem 4, B |≈ A.
Suppose that A is a contradiction. Then, since any function w is an
extension of some probability distribution, w(A) = 0. So we have w(A ∧
B) > 0 = w(A) · w(B). Hence by Theorem 4, B |≈ A.
Ad. (ii) =⇒ (iii). It follows from the rule (Sym).
Ad. (iii) =⇒ (i). Suppose that A is neither a classical tautology, nor a
contradiction. We will construct a probability valuation w as an extension
of some probability distribution with w(A) = 1/2 and w(A ∧ ¬A) = 0 <
1/4 = 1/2 · 1/2 = w(A) · w(¬A). Then by Theorem 4, A 6|≈ ¬A.
Let us recall that A is a sentence in some n-generated language, so
in such a language there are 2n state descriptions. By proposition 2 A is
classically equivalent to some disjunction B of a unique non-empty subset of
state descriptions. Let SB denote the set of all state descriptions occurring
in B. Suppose that SB has got k elements. We define a function f on SD
in the following way:
f(s) =
{ 1
2k if s ∈ SB
1
2(2n−k) if s 6∈ SB .
It is to check that:
∑
s∈SD
f(s) =
k∑
i=1
1
2k
+
2n−k∑
i=1
1
2(2n − k)
= 1.
Therefore f is a probability distribution. By Theorem 3 f can be uniquely
extended to valuation w : Ln 7→ [0, 1]. So we have:
w(B) =
∑
s∈SB
f(s) =
k∑
i=1
1
2k
= 1/2.
So by (W6), w(¬B) = 1 − w(B) = 1/2. By (W8), since A |= |=B and
¬A |= |=¬B, w(A) = w(B) and w(¬A) = w(¬B). Therefore w(A) = 1/2 =
w(¬A). 
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The proof could be simplified in the way avoiding the above calcula-
tions. Such a simplified proof uses Theorem 6 for the last implication.
However, we have decided to present here all that redundant calculations
to show the complete construction of a valuation. Let us note that for any
contingent sentence A and a real number 0 < a < 1 we can construct in a
way similar to that in the proof such a valuation w that w(A) = a.
By |∼n we denote the least binary relation on Ln closed with respect
to (Cl) and (Sym).
Proposition 8. (Representation) For any n, |∼n = |≈n .
Proof. From Theorem 6 it is enough to show that A |∼B if and only if
A |= B or B |= A.
⇐= If A |= B, then by (Cl) A |∼B. If B |= A, then by (Cl) B |∼ A and
then by (Sym) A |∼B.
=⇒ If A |∼B, then by (Sym) B |∼A. However, |∼ is closed under (Cl), so
we can get A |= B or B |= A. 
4. Some properties of |≈w
In this section we consider the relations |≈nw for arbitrary valuation w and
some n-generated sentential language.
We have a set of additional rules that may characterize a consequence
relation:
(RW)
|=A→B, C|≈A
C|≈B
(Cut)
A∧B|≈C, A|≈B
A|≈C
(Ad)
A|≈C, B|≈C
A∧B|≈C
(Mon)
A|≈C
A∧B|≈C
(CM)
A|≈B, A|≈C
A∧B|≈C
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(Eq)
A|≈B, B|≈A, A|≈C
B|≈C
(Or)
A|≈C, B|≈C
A∨B|≈C
(T)
A|≈B, B|≈C
A|≈C
As a consequence of Theorem 6 the relation |≈ is closed under the rules
(Ad) and (Or). However, the rest of the rules ((RW), (Cut), (Mon), (CM),
(Eq), (Ad), (T)) fails.
For example, to show the failure of (CM), we take p |≈ p ∧ q and
p |≈ p ∧ r, since p ∧ q |= p and p ∧ r |= p (by (Cl) and Theorem 6).
However, at the same time p ∧ (p ∧ q) 6|≈ p ∧ r. Other cases have similar
counterexamples.
The next theorem, Theorem 9, shows that (Ad) and (Or) are not the
case for some |≈nw. As a consequence, |≈
n⊂|≈nw, for some w.
Theorem 9. For any i > 2, there exists a valuation w in Li such that for
the relation |≈iw rules (Ad), (Or) do not hold.
Proof. We will prove the theorem for i = 3. Valuation w defined below
can be extended in a natural way to any language Lk, for k > 3.
The tabular below determine a probability distribution. The last col-
umn set the probabilities of terms listed in a given line – taken in a conjunc-
tion they form state descriptions that sum up vertically to 1. For example
0,4 in the third line means that w(p ∧ ¬q ∧ r) = 0, 4.
To calculate any conjunction of literals we just add all the numbers in
the last column of all the lines containing all literals of a given conjunction.
For example to calculate w(p ∧ q) we take line 1 and line 5 and then add
respective numbers: 0+0,1=0,1.
According to the table 1 we have in particular: w(p ∧ q) = 0, 2; w(p ∧
r) = 0, 3; w(q ∧ r) = 0, 3; w(p) = 0, 5; w(q) = 0, 5; w(r) = 0, 6.
(Ad) We will show that (Ad) fails under w. Thus we have w(p∧r) = 0, 3 >
0, 3 = 0, 5 · 0, 6 = w(p) · w(r) and w(q ∧ r) = 0, 3 > 0, 3 = 0, 5 · 0, 6 =
w(q) · w(r). Hence p |≈ r and q |≈ r, by Theorem 4. On the other hand
w(p∧q∧r) = 0 < 0, 12 = 0, 2 ·0, 6 = 0, 3 = w(p∧q) ·w(r). Hence p∧q 6|≈ r,
by Theorem 4.
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p q r = 0
¬p q r = 0,3
p ¬q r = 0,3
¬p ¬q r = 0
p q ¬r = 0,2
¬p q ¬r = 0
p ¬q ¬r = 0
¬p ¬q ¬r = 0,2
Table 1. Values of state descriptions
(Or) Since w(r ∧ ¬q) = w(¬q ∧ r) = 0, 3, by (W8), and w(r) = 0, 6;
w(¬q) = 0, 5; so w(r ∧ ¬q) > 0, 3 > 0, 6 · 0, 5 = w(r) · w(¬q) = 0, 3; and
hence r |≈ ¬q, by Theorem 4. Since w(p ∧ ¬q) = 0, 3 and w(p) = 0, 5;
w(¬q) = 0, 5; so w(p ∧ ¬q) > 0, 5 · 0, 5 = w(p) · w(¬q) = 0, 25; and hence
p |≈ ¬q.
Now, (p∨ r)∧¬q is logically equivalent to (∗): (p∧¬q∧ r)∨ (¬p∧¬q∧
r) ∨ (p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r). However, w((∗)) = 0, 3 + 0 + 0 = 0, 3; and by (W8),
w((p∨r)∧¬q) = 0, 3. At the same time w(p∨r) = w(p)+w(r)−w(p∧r) =
0, 5 + 0, 6 − 0, 3 = 0, 8, by (W9). Thus w(p ∨ r) · w(¬q) = 0, 8 · 0, 5 = 0, 4
and w((p ∨ r) ∧ ¬q) < w(p ∨ r) · w(¬q). As a consequence p ∨ r 6|≈ ¬q, by
Theorem 4. 
Proposition 10. (i) If a valuation w in L1 has at least one value different
from 0 and 1, then A |≈1w B if and only if A |= B or B |= A.
(ii) If w has only values 0 and 1, then A |≈1w B, for any A, B.
Proof. (i) Suppose that w(p) = r 6∈ {0, 1}. By the rule (Cl) i (Sym)
if A |= B or B |= A, then A |≈1w B. Let us suppose that for some w:
A |≈1w B, but neither A |= B nor B |= A. Since we have only two state
descriptions: p and ¬p, so we can assume that A and B may be only
of forms logically equivalent to sentences: p ∧ ¬p, p, ¬p, p ∨ ¬p. The
only such a pair A, B that A 6|= B and B 6|= A is p and ¬p. However,
w(p ∧ ¬p) = 0 < r · (1− r) = w(p) · w(¬p) – a contradiction.
(ii) Obviously w(p) = 0 or w(¬p) = 0. If w(¬p) = 0, then w(p ∧ ¬p) =
0 ≥ 0 = w(p) · w(¬p). Hence p |≈1w ¬p. Similarly we check other cases. 
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We will modify here the rules investigated in this section to adopt them
to the relation of support. Intuitively, the first idea of such a modification
is to limit the scope of rules. We will call the rules modified and add suffix
-m (as modified) to their original names.
(RW-m)
|=A→B, C|=A
C|≈B
(Cut-m)
A∧B|≈C, A|=B
A|≈C
(Ad)
A|≈C, B|=C
A∧B|≈C
(Mon-m)
A|=C
A∧B|≈C
(CM-m)
A|=B, A|≈C
A∧B|≈C
(Eq-m)
A|≈B, B|=A, A|=C
B|≈C
(Or-m)
A|=¬B, A|≈C, B|≈C
A∨B|≈C
(T-m)
A|=B, B|=C
A|≈C
Theorem 11. The rules (RW-m), (Cut-m), (Mon-m), (CM-m), (Eq-m),
(T-m) hold for any valuation w.
Proof. Let us consider for example the few following cases.
(Cut-m) Let us suppose that A ∧ B |≈ C and A |= B. Then from (W8)
w(A) = w(A∧B). We have w(A∧C) ≥ w(A∧B∧C) ≥ w(A∧B) ·w(C) =
w(A) · w(C). In consequence A |≈ C.
(CM-m) Let us suppose that A |= B and A |≈ C. Then from (W8) w(A) =
w(A ∧ B) and w(A ∧ C) = w(A ∧ B ∧ C). We have w(A ∧ B ∧ C) =
w(A ∧ C) ≥ w(A) · w(C) = w(A ∧B) · w(C). In consequence A ∧B |≈ C.
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(Or-m) Let us suppose that A |= ¬B, A |≈ C and B |≈ C. Then of
course A ∧ C |= ¬(B ∧ C). In consequence – by (W8) and (W4) – we
have w((A ∨ B) ∧ C) = w((A ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧ C)) = w(A ∧ C) + w(B ∧ C) ≥
w(A) · w(C) + w(B) · w(C) = (w(A) + w(B)) · w(C) = w(A ∨ B) · w(C).
Hence A ∨B |≈ C.
The remaining cases are provable by properties of classical consequence
relation |=. Some of them, like for example (Eq-m) or (T-m), are particular
instances of (Cl). 
Proposition 12. For any n there exists only finitely many distinct rela-
tions |≈nw. The number of distinct relations is less than 2
24n .
Proof. Let for A ∈ Ln [A] denote set {B : B |= A and A |= B} and let ln
denote such a set that any set ln ∩ [A] has exactly one element. The set ln
is finite, it has 22n elements. Given a valuation w, from (LLE) and (RLE):
if A1 |= |=A2, B1 |= |=B2, then A1 |≈
n
w B1 iff A2 |≈
n
w B2.
As a consequence any relation |≈nw is uniquely determined by its be-
havior on the set ln. Hence the upper limit of the number of relations |≈
n
w
is the number of subsets of ln × ln. 
Valuations w1 and w2 are equivalent (symbolically: w1 + w2) iff
|≈w1=|≈w2 . The problem of a useful characterization of the relation +
we leave to a future examination.
5. Appendix: Two demonstrative examples.
The conditions of monotonicity (Mon) and idempotency (Cut) are very
natural and important from a point of view of the theory of logical conse-
quence. However, we saw they fail in the context of support relation, which
is the case since probability can change in respect to appearance of a new
information. For this reason we would like to present two examples, which
are demonstrative illustrations of such failures.
The failure of (Mon). A pot with 10 balls is given. Each ball has a
number 1 or 2 and is either red or green. Among them there are: three
red balls with 1, two green balls with with 1, two red balls with 2, and
three green balls with 2. We choose a ball randomly. Suppose it is red.
Intuitively we expect that there is rather 1 than 2 on this ball, since there
are more red balls with 1 than with 2. We will construct a logic which
confirm and formalize this intuition.
166 Tomasz Jarmuz˙ek, Mateusz Klonowski and Jacek Malinowski
Let x ∈ {red, green, 1, 2}. Symbol x is a shorthand for a sentence: ‘A
ball of the color/number x is randomly chosen’. Let L4 denote a proposi-
tional language with four variables.2 Each variable of L4 corresponds to one
of the sentences listed above. The valuation w will be defined as a probabil-
ity – for any sentence A, w(A) is a probability of an event described by A.
wA(B) denotes the conditional probability based on w: wA(B) =
w(A∧B)
w(A) ,
provided that w(A) 6= 0. In particular we have:
a) w(1) = 1/2, since half of balls is with 1, and the rest with 2
b) w(1 ∧ (red ∧ 1)) = w(red ∧ 1) = 3/10, since three of ten balls are red
and 1
c) w(1 ∧ green) = 2/10, since two of ten balls are 1 and green
d) w((1 ∧ green) ∧ (red ∧ 1)) = w(green ∧ red) = 0, since no ball is red
and green.
We have w1(red ∧ 1) =
w(1∧(red∧1))
w(1) =
3/10
1/2 = 3/5 > 3/10 = w(red ∧ 1).
Hence 1 |≈w red ∧ 1. If we add new premise green to 1, then relation of
support will fail. We have 1∧ green 6|≈w red∧ 1, because w1∧green(red∧ 1) =
w((1∧green)∧(red∧1))
w(1∧green) =
0
2/10 = 0 < 3/10 = w(red∧ 1). Therefore 1 |≈w red∧ 1
and 1 ∧ green 6|≈w red ∧ 1, so (Mon) fails.
The failure of (Cut). Let us consider the following story. Somebody
has been murdered. There are four suspects: a, b, c, d. Suppose that only
one person is committed the murder. Initially the four suspects are equally
suspected and there is no reason to suspect anybody else. Then two levels
of evidence arrive.
Evidence 1. Suspect d, and only d, becomes more suspected. The proba-
bility that he is the murder increases from 1/4 to 1/3. Therefore probability
of being the murder for a, b, c is now 2/3 · 1/3 = 2/9.
Evidence 2. Suspects b and c are not longer suspected. For example they
can have a very strong alibi. So, when this evidence arrives only a and d
remain suspected.3
2It is obvious that any of the atomic sentences could be represented as a negation of
some sentence, for example it could be: green ↔ ¬red and 2 ↔ ¬1. So, we could reduce
the language to two variables. However, for the simplicity of considerations we assume
four atomic sentences.
3This story is a modification of the story considered in J. Pearl [89] and [2002].
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Let x ∈ {a, b, c, d} be a shorthand for ‘x is guilty’. Let e1 and e2 de-
note respectively the content of level of evidence 1 and of level of evidence
2. Let L6 denotes the propositional language with 6 sentential variables.
While interpreting the language we link the variables with sentences from
the story. It will not cause misunderstanding if we just call the variables re-
spectively a, b, c, d, e1, e2. Let w denotes a valuation which to any sentences
of L5 ascribe its probability respectively to the story above. In particular
we get:
a) for x ∈ {a, b, c, d} w(x) = 1/4, since there are four suspects
b) w(e1) = w(e1) = 1/2, since it can be the case what evidences say or
may not be
c) we1(d) = 1/3, since e1 states that probability of d increases to 1/3
d) we1(a) = 2/9, since e1 states that only probability of d increases to
1/3
e) we1(e2) > w(e2), since e1 does not decrease a probability of e2.
Let us calculate a conditional probability we1∧e2(a). According to evi-
dence 1 probability of a, b, c, d is respectively equal to 2/9, 2/9, 2/9, 1/3.
So we1(b) +we1(c) = 4/9. When evidence 2 arrives probabilities of b and c
go down to 0 and probabilities of a and d go up. The prior probability of
b and c should be divided among a and d in such a way that a proportion
of probabilities of a and d is preserved. We have then to find a number
0 6 x 6 1 such that:
we1(a)
we1(d)
=
2/9
1/3
=
x
1− x
Therefore x = 2/5 and hence:
we1∧e2(a) = 2/9 + 2/5 · 4/9 = 2/5 > 1/4 = w(a)
In consequence e1 ∧ e2 |≈w a. On the other hand, we1(a) = 2/9 < 1/4 =
w(a) and hence e1 6|≈w a. In result we get e1 ∧ e2 |≈w a, e1 |≈w e2 and
e1 6|≈w a. Therefore (Cut) fails.
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